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• The mystery: Growth despite poor governance
• Rapid economic since 1999, averaging near double-
digits: 
– 2006, 2005, and 2004 saw 11%, 13%, and 10%, 
respectively
• Poor governance: 
– 162 out of 179 countries in the 2007 Corruption Perception 
Index, 151 out of 163 in 2006, 130 out of 158 in 2005
– Govindicators.org (World Bank Institute) shows that 
Cambodia is poorly governed by peer-group comparison, 
while China and Vietnam are relatively well governed by 




• What explains Cambodia’s double-digit 
growth despite poor governance?
• Why do some sectors thrive while others fail 
under such conditions? 
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Methodology
• Review of the relevant literature
• Analysis of detailed semi-structured interviews 
with more than 50 firms/businessmen, 
government, non-government, and donor 
officials
• Two focused cases examined: Garments 
(established) and Rice (emerging)*
*Study from which this chapter is based also looked at Livestock as a stunted sector.
6
Political Economy Context 
• Nature of Cambodian Politics
• Functions the Regime Has “Provided”: Peace, 
Private Sector “Development”, and Patronage
• The Oknha Economy
• Advisors
• Politics and Business
• Aid, Taxes, and Revenues
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Aid, Taxes, and Revenues
Cambodia’s Aid, Tax, and Domestic Revenues 2002-2006
33N/AN/AN/ACPIA efficiency of revenue mobilization 
rating (1=low to 6=high)
9.819.689.869.4110.31Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)
8.197.918.157.558.19Tax revenue (% of GDP)
37.2638.7435.2238.1336.52Aid per capita (current US$)
7.598.999.4911.5011.79Aid (% of GNI)
84.68113.18110.67118.66120.35Aid (% of central government 
expenditures)
528.99540.68483.19514.31484.25ODA and official aid (current US$ 
millions)
20062005200420032002
Source: WDI Online. Accessed: 25 August 2008.
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Garment sector: a Cambodian success story?
• Background to the sector
• Why has the sector been able to establish itself 
in a challenging governance environment?




Agriculture in Cambodia 2000-2006
79.780.380.981.482.082.583.1Rural population (% of total population)
..........70.273.7Employment in agriculture (% of total 
employment)
27.030.329.628.928.327.727.0Agricultural land (% of land area)
5.515.7-0.910.5-2.53.6-0.4Agriculture, value added (annual % growth)
30.130.829.532.031.234.435.9Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)
2006200520042003200220012000
Source: Word Development Indicators Online. Accessed 11 November 2008.
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Rice sector: a nascent story?
• Background to the sector
• How is the sector establishing itself in a 
challenging governance environment?
• Export regime—Cambodian rice and the 
opportunity of Everything But Arms




c. Nature of the 
rents (and how 
they are/were 
shared)
b. Constraints (not 
all are governance-
specific)





Economic rent is a measure of market power; for garments, quotas created rents
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Sectoral Analysis (1) 
•A leading rice miller is 
an Oknha
•That state enterprise, 
Green Trade, is now one of 
two entities allowed to 
export 100 tons or more 
without the need to apply 
for a license. 
•Of the remaining rice 
millers, there is little 
evidence that they are 
themselves Oknhas, at least 
not at any higher rate than 
entrepreneurs of similar 
small and medium 
enterprises.
•Strong foreign 
involvement means that 
there is little to no use 
obtaining the title of Oknha
•Garments likely has 
Oknhas, but none is 
known per se
•Some Oknhas probably 
own the land which 







No, this doesn’t look like
an Oknha or Lok Chumteav!
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Sectoral Analysis (2)
•Lack of credit and high cost of 
capital
•High cost of transport and 
storage
•Low yields relative to neighboring 
countries
o Poor soils
o Poor irrigation (rain-fed) 
and water management
o Low extension services 
capacity and research 
capacity
•Inability to export to developed 
country due to hygiene standards 
and logistics
•Any enterprise above a certain 
level is heavily affected by 
informal payments
•High cost of energy and 
unreliability (again, production is on 
diesel generators) 
•High labor turnover is a major 
constraint (48% at one of the 
best factories operating)
•High number of strikes 
(though declining relative to a 
couple of years ago)
•High electricity costs and 
unreliability (50% off the grid)
•High cost of export and 
facilitation
•Low productivity (relative to 
Vietnam)
•High cost of transport
•US (and worldwide) 
recession is reducing demand









•Rents shared with economic 
police; customs; line ministries
•MoC, through SOE Green Trade, 
seeks to capture rents 
•With the National Cambodian 
Rice Millers Association, GTC can 
export in excess of 100 tons 
without license
•Rents were high and relatively 
shared as the price of rice increased
•Farmers reacted to economic 
opportunity by increasing output, to 
their benefit 
•European Union’s “Everything 
But Arms” initiative will enable 
Cambodia to export rice duty-free 
to Europe. 
•Garment manufacturers must be 
members of GMAC to officially 
export
•Participation in Better Factories
•GMAC can collectively bargain 
with authorities
•Rents originated from export 
quotas to US and Europe
•Now through WTO membership 
•Rents were shared with the 
economic police (Ministry of 
Interior) on the way to and from 
Sihanoukville port even though 
trucking companies act as agents; 
with customs officials (Ministry of 
Economy and Finance), with 
CamControl (MoC).
•350,000 workers employed












• The garment industry, the leading 
growth sector, offers useful 
lessons for rice, which is newly 
emerging
• The role of international drivers, 
foreign investors, domestic 
collective action mechanisms, and 
high stakes seem to have been 
critical in these achievements
• This analysis of the growth / 
governance paradox points 
towards two future directions.
